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Abstract. It is now cost-effective to outsource large dataset and perform query
over the cloud. However, in this scenario, there exist serious security and privacy
issues that sensitive information contained in the dataset can be leaked. The most
effective way to address that is to encrypt the data before outsourcing. Never-
theless, it remains a grand challenge to process queries in ciphertext efficiently.
In this work, we shall focus on solving one representative query task, namely
dynamic skyline query, in a secure manner over the cloud. However, it is diffi-
cult to be performed on encrypted data as its dynamic domination criteria require
both subtraction and comparison, which cannot be directly supported by a sin-
gle encryption scheme efficiently. To this end, we present a novel framework
called SCALE. It works by transforming traditional dynamic skyline domination
into pure comparisons. The whole process can be completed in single-round in-
teraction between user and the cloud. We theoretically prove that the outsourced
database, query requests, and returned results are all kept secret under our model.
Moreover, we also present an efficient strategy for dynamic insertion and deletion
of stored records. Empirical study over a series of datasets demonstrates that our
framework improves the efficiency of query processing by nearly three orders
of magnitude compared to the state-of-the-art.
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1 Introduction
With the rapid expansion in data volumes, many individuals and organizations are in-
creasingly inclined to outsource their data to public cloud services since they provide
a cost-effective way to support large-scale data storage and query processing. As a
major type of query and fundamental building block for various applications, skyline
query [7] has become an important issue in database research for extracting interest-
ing objects from multi-dimensional datasets. The skyline query processing is widely
adopted in many applications that require multi-criteria decision making such as mar-
ket research [13], location based systems [17], web services study [3], etc. The skyline
⋆ corresponding author: Hui Li, hli@xidian.edu.cn
operator filters out a set of interesting points based on a group of evaluation criteria
from a large set of points. A point is considered as interesting, if there does not exist a
point that is at least as good in all criteria and better in at least one criteria.
However, similar to other types of query, outsourcing skyline query workload to a
public cloud will inevitably raise privacy issues. Since a real-world database may often
contain sensitive information such as personal electronic mails, health records, financial
transactions, etc., a cloud service provider may illegally spy on the data and invade the
privacy of the data owner and users.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of secure skyline querying on the cloud plat-
form aiming to protect the security of outsourced data, query request and results. Secure
query processing on encrypted data is an important research field in outsourcing compu-
tation and has been extensively studied during recent years [30,20]. For instance, fully
homomorphic encryption schemes [14] ensure strong security while enabling arbitrary
computations on the encrypted data. Modular Order-preserving encryption [5,9] pro-
vides an intuitive security model which supports comparison over the ciphertext without
decryption. Despite the promising achievements in the area of secure query processing,
it remains a grand challenge for processing dynamic skyline queries over ciphertext,
where the skyline operator is executed with respect to some query point [25]. The main
reason for the problem is as follows. Given a query request, a dynamic skyline query
requires performing both comparison and distance evaluation online simultaneously.
Unfortunately, accomplishing this task over ciphertext cannot be realized efficiently via
existing encryption schemes.
For instance, suppose that a medical institution wishes to outsource its electronic di-
abetes records to some public cloud service, resisting to leak the content of the records
to the cloud server. An electronic diabetes record consists of a series of attributes, in-
cluding ID, age, FBGL (fasting blood glucose level), etc. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} denote
a set of electronic diabetes records. When the medical institution receives a new record
q, it expects the cloud server to retrieve a similar record to enhance and personalize the
treatment for the new patient q. However, it is usually difficult or even impossible to
uniformly assign weights for all the attributes to return the nearest neighbor (e.g., pi is
the nearest if only age is involved while pj is the nearest if only FBGL is taken into ac-
count). In light of that, dynamic skyline query provides all possible Pareto records that
are not dominated by any other ones. Given a query q, we can compute the difference
between each attribute for pi and q. Let ti be the difference tuple between pi and q, and
ti[j] = |pi[j]− q[j]| for each dimension j. An object ti dominates tj if it is better than
tj in at least one dimension and not worse in every other dimensions. If an object cannot
be dominated by any other object, this object is one of the skyline points that needs to
be returned. As shown in Fig. 1, there are five patient records p1, . . . , p5. Given a query
record q, we calculate t1, . . . , t5 and can easily identify the skyline points as t5 and t2.
Therefore, p5 and p2 are the results for the dynamic skyline query w.r.t q.
Notably, in the above example, a dynamic skyline query requires performing both
subtraction and comparison online. As there is no practical encryption scheme support-
ing both operators over ciphertext, existing model employs secure multiparty compu-
tation over at least to third-party non-collusion clouds and processes the query with
multiple rounds of interactions. In this work, we present a novel framework called
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Fig. 1: Dynamic Skyline Query Example.
SCALE (SeCure dynAmic skyLine quErying) by transforming traditional skyline dom-
ination criteria, which requires both subtraction and comparison, into comparison only.
In this way, we are able to present a new scheme that can support dynamic skyline
query over ciphertext without any help from a second cloud and can be completed in
a single-round interaction between user and the cloud. We theoretically prove that the
outsourced database, query requests, and returned results are all kept secret under our
model. Empirical study over four datasets including both synthetic and real-world ones
demonstrate that our framework outperforms a state-of-the-art method by nearly three
orders of magnitude. Notably, as a special case of dynamic skyline query, skyline com-
putation can also be processed securely and efficiently under our model (with trivial
modification).
In summary, this work makes the following contributions.
– We propose a new scheme to encrypt the outsourced database and query request.
Based on the scheme, dynamic skyline query can be answered without decrypting
the database or the query. Within the scheme, the cloud server and data user need
only one interaction during the query.
– We theoretically prove that our model is secure if the cloud is curious-but-honest.
– In addition to the secure query scheme, we also present an efficient mechanism
for modifications over existing database records, including insertion, deletion and
updating.
– We also theoretically show that the skyline points can be computed efficiently and
correctly.
– Empirical study over both synthetic and real-world datasets justify that our model is
superior to the state-of-the-art w.r.t the query response time, by more than 3 orders
of magnitude faster.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we conduct a literature
review for the related work. In Section 3 we formally present the problem definition
and system model for this work. The detailed designs of encryption scheme and query
framework are discussed in Section 4. Empirical study and corresponding results are
shown in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude this work.
2 Related Work
2.1 Skyline Query in Plaintext
The skyline query is particularly important for several applications involving multi-
criteria decision making. The computation of the skyline is equivalent to determin-
ing the maximal vector problem in computational geometry [18,29], or equivalently
the Pareto optimal set [29] problem in operations research. Since [18] earliest stud-
ied the method and complexity of skyline computation (i.e., static skyline query)4, it
has been extensively studied in the database field. Block-Nested-Loop [7], Divide-and-
Conquer [12], Nearest Neighbor [16], Branch-and-Bound Skyline [25] and series of
works afterwards have progressively improved the efficiency on general version of sky-
line computation [22,27,31].
A dynamic skyline query is a variation of skyline computation that was first intro-
duced in [25,26]. Instead of computing the skyline points purely from the given dataset,
dynamic skyline query returns series of points that are not dominated by any others with
respect to q. In another word, skyline computation can be viewed as a special case of
dynamic skyline query where q is fixed as origin point and only the comparison (without
distance evaluation) is required.
2.2 Secure Skyline Query over Encrypted Data
With the development of cryptography, Encryption technology is gradually applied in
the database field.
Bothe et al. [8] presented an approach for skyline computation over Encrypted
Data. It provided efficiency analysis and empirical study for computing skyline points
and decrypting the results. However, it failed to provide any formal security guaran-
tee. Moreover, as discussed above, skyline computation only requires comparison with-
out distance computation; processing it in encrypted domain can be easily performed
through Order Preserving Encryption [2] or Order Revealing Encryption [5,9]. Another
work [10] proposed three novel schemes that enable efficient verification of skyline
query results returned by an unauthentic cloud server. Their work focuses on the veri-
fication but not privacy issues, and does not work on ciphertext. It is orthogonal to the
scope of this paper.
Liu et al. [20] proposed the first semantically secure protocol for dynamic skyline
query over the cloud platform. The scheme adopts both Paillier cryptosystem [23] and
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMP) as building blocks. Although it is proved to be
semantically secure, the protocol suffers from huge computation cost and strict system
model. In fact, as a query framework, the response time is the most important issue for
the success of the application, but the performance of [20] is far from satisfactory in
this aspect.
4 In the following of this work, we shall refer to static skyline query as skyline computation.
2.3 Order-Revealing Encryption
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) scheme [2], whose ciphertext preserve the original
ordering of the plaintexts, has been extensively applied in range query over encrypted
databases.
The ideal security goal for an order-preserving scheme, IND-OCPA [4], is to reveal
no additional information about the plaintext values besides their order. Boldyreva et al.
[4] were the first to provide a rigorous solution to the problem. They settled on a weaker
security guarantee, which was shown to leak at least half of the plaintext bits [5,9]. Popa
et al. [28] presented the ideal-secure order-preserving encoding scheme. [15] showed
how to achieve the even stronger notion of frequency-hidingOPE. However, these ideal-
secure OPE schemes require rounds of interactions between client and server.
To improve the security of OPE, Boneh et al. [6] presented Order-Revealing En-
cryption schemes (ORE), another method for circumventing the lower bound deduced
by Boldyreva et al. [4]. In an ORE scheme, the numerical order of two ciphertexts does
not necessarily reflect that of the original messages as OPE does. Instead, the order of
the original messages can only be decided by a carefully designed function over the
corresponding ciphertexts. Pandey and Ruselakis [24] previously considered this type
of relaxation in the context of property-preserving encryption. In a property-preserving
encryption scheme, there is a publicly computable function that can be evaluated on
ciphertexts to determine the value of some property on the underlying plaintexts. OPE
can thus be viewed as a property-preserving encryption scheme where the computable
function is the comparison operation. Pandey and Rouselakis introduced and explored
several indistinguishable-based notions of security for property-preserving encryption.
However, they did not construct an order-revealing encryption scheme. Chenette et al.
[11] built efficiently implementable order-revealing encryption based on pseudoran-
dom functions. Lewi et al. [19] improved the above scheme. The ORE scheme in [19]
is adopted for this work, and it will be discussed further in Section 4.
3 Problem Definition
In this section, we shall introduce a group of key concepts for skyline query, and finally
describe the system and security models in this paper. For ease of discussion, the key
notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1.
3.1 Skyline Query Definition
In this part, we shall introduce a series of key concepts for skyline problem that is
important for the following discussion.
Definition 1 (Domination). Given two points pα, pβ in d-dimensional space, we say
pα dominates pβ (denoted by pα ≺ pβ), if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, pα[i] ≤ pβ[i], and ∃i ∈
{1, . . . , d}, pα[i] < pβ [i].
Definition 2 (Skyline Computation). Given a dataset P = {p1, . . . , pn} in d- dimen-
sional space, skyline computation returns the points set S ⊆ P , such that ∀p ∈ S,
∄p′ ∈ P such that p′ ≺ p (i.e., ∀p ∈ S, p′ ∈ P , p′ cannot dominate p).
Table 1: Summary of notations
Notation Definition
n The number of tuples in the database
d The dimension of database
q The query tuple
Enc(q) Ciphertext of the query tuple
Enc(2q) Ciphertext of the doubled query tuple
P = {p1, . . . , pn} A database with n tuples
E(P ) Ciphertexts of tuples for P
E(Φ) Ciphertexts of the pairwise sums for tuples in
P
pi[j] The j − th attribute of pi
keys[·] The set of private keys
Definition 3 (Dynamic Domination). Given two points pα, pβ and a query point q in
d-dimensional space, we say pα dynamically dominates pβ with respect to q (denoted
by pα ≺q pβ), if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, |pα[i] − q[i]| ≤ |pβ [i] − q[i]|, and ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , d},
|pα[i]− q[i]| < |pβ [i]− q[i]|.
Definition 4 (Dynamic Skyline Query). Given a dataset P = {p1, . . . , pn} and a
query q in d-dimensional space, dynamic skyline query returns the set S ⊆ P , such
that ∀p ∈ S, ∄p′ ∈ P such that p′ ≺q p (i.e., ∀p ∈ S, p′ ∈ P , p′ cannot dynamically
dominate p with respect to q).
A common algorithm (i.e., BNL [7]) for dynamic skyline query is shown in Algo-
rithm 1. It first calculates the differences (i.e., ti) between each tuple (i.e., pi) and the
query request (i.e., q) in every dimension (Lines 1-3). When a tuple pi is read from P ,
it is added to S if S is empty (Lines 5-6). Otherwise, we shall compare pi’s correspond-
ing difference tuple with respect to q, namely ti, with that of each tuple in S. In case
ti ≺ tj , where pj ∈ S, we shall delete pj from S. If there is no pj ∈ S such that tj ≺ ti,
we shall add pi to S (Lines 10-11, 16-18). The algorithm repeats this process for the
remaining tuples in P , and finally returns S (Line 21).
We shall use this as the basis for our secure skyline model. Notably, this is not
the most efficient algorithm for plaintext skyline query. We select this method as our
building block for the following reasons. Firstly, the state-of-the-art solution for secure
dynamic skyline is [20], it adopts BNL [7] as the basic building block. In line with them
and to make a fair comparison, our solution is constructed according to the same query
framework. Secondly, BNL is a common and popular iterative algorithm for answering
dynamic skyline query in plaintext. Thirdly, as discussed in Section 1, the key challenge
in secure dynamic skyline query lies in the solution for performing both subtraction and
comparison over ciphertext. A secure model building on any other (plaintext) dynamic
skyline query algorithm inevitably has to address that. In other words, although our
Algorithm 1 Basic Skyline Query Algorithm
Require: The dataset P and a query tuple q
Ensure: The result set of skyline points S
1: for i in 1, . . . , n and j in 1, . . . , d do
2: let ti[j] = |pi[j]− q[j]|
3: end for
4: for i in 1, . . . , n do
5: if S is empty then
6: add pi to S
7: else
8: flag ← True
9: for each pj ∈ S do
10: if tj ≺ ti then
11: flag ← False
12: else if ti ≺ tj then
13: delete pj from S
14: end if
15: end for
16: if flag == True then
17: add pi to S
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: return S
solution in this work adopts Algorithm 1 as the foundation, it can be easily adapted to
other (plaintext) dynamic skyline query algorithms.
3.2 System Model and Design Goals
Our system model involves three types of participants: a data owner, a cloud server
and a group of query users. The cloud server is assumed to have large storage and
computation ability, and it provides outsourcing storage and computation services. As
Fig. 2 shows, the data owner employs the cloud service and stores his private database
in the cloud server. To preserve data privacy, the data owner will encrypt his dataset, and
only outsource the encrypted dataset to the cloud. Every query user may submit a query
point (i.e., q) toward the system. The query request may be locally encrypted before
sending to the cloud server. Then, the cloud server will perform dynamic skyline query
over encrypted database and query request without decryption. Afterwards, it returns
the encrypted results to the user. Finally, the user decrypts these results using their own
private keys.
Security model We parameterize the security model by a collection of leakage func-
tions
L = (LEncrypt,LQuery ,LInsert,LDelete).
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Fig. 2: The system model of secure skyline query
The functions describe what information the protocol leaks to the adversary. The def-
inition ensures that the scheme does not reveal any information beyond what can be
inferred from the leakage functions.
We define two games GameR,A and GameS,A as follows. The adversary repeat-
edly encrypts data and queries skyline points, and receives the transcripts generated
from Encrypt() and Query() algorithms in the real game GameR,A or receives the
transcripts generated by the simulator S(LEncrypt) and S(LQuery) in the ideal game
GameS,A. Eventually,A outputs a bit 0 (GameR,A) or 1 (GameS,A).
Definition 5 (Adaptively secure). A scheme is L-adaptively-secure if for all proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, there exists an efficient simulator S such that the
following equation holds:
∣
∣Pr[GameR,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[GameS,A(λ) = 1]
∣
∣ ≤ negl(λ).
Design goals Our design goals contain both efficiency and privacy, including database
privacy, query privacy, and result privacy. The details are as follows.
– Data owners need to encrypt the database before it is sent to the cloud server. Mean-
while, the content in the database is not leaked to the cloud server.
– Query request, as well as the results, should not be revealed to the cloud server
throughout query processing.
– As a query processing framework, efficiency should be considered as one of the
most important issue for measuring its success. Although the entire query process-
ing is performed in ciphertext here, it should minimize the additional cost associ-
ated with it.
4 The SCALE Framework
In this section, we shall introduce the SCALE framework for secure dynamic skyline
querying under the proposed system model. As discussed above, processing dynamic
skyline query given a query point q requires performing both subtraction and compar-
ison. Addressing both tasks in ciphertext form is challenging as there is no practical
encryption scheme that supports both operations simultaneously.
To address this challenge, we reinvestigate the entire dynamic skyline query work-
flow described in Definition 3.1 and Algorithm 1. Our investigation revealed an impor-
tant fact that may lead to an effective solution. Notably, to answer a dynamic skyline
query given a request q, quantifying the differences between each point pi and q through
all dimensions is not mandatory. Instead, what we need is the relative order of such dif-
ferences for a group of different pi.
Observation 1 In order to evaluate whether pα dynamically dominates pβ with respect
to q, we do not need to know the exact values for the difference vectors Tα and Tβ , where
Ti[j] = |pi[j]− q[j]| for j ∈ [1, . . . , d]. In fact, what we really need to know is whether
Tα[j] ≤ Tβ[j] or Tα[j] < Tβ [j] for j ∈ [1, . . . , d]. For simplicity, for an arbitrary
dimension j, we need to know whether pα[j] or pβ[j] is close to q[j]. To answer that,
we have to consider two possible cases depending on whether q[j] falls in the interval
between pα[j] and pβ [j]. Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b depict the cases. In the case of Fig. 3a,
the order between Tα[j] and Tβ[j] can be interpreted as the relationship between pα[j]
and pβ [j]. In the case of Fig. 3b, the order between Tα[j] and Tβ[j] can be interpreted
as the relationship between pα[j] + pβ [j] and q[j] + q[j].
In the aforementioned study, we notice that the multi-type-operation requirement
(i.e., with both subtraction and comparison) in dynamic skyline query can be trans-
formed to uni-type-operation involving only comparison. Inspired by this critical
point, current encryption schemes that support comparison over ciphertext can be adopted
in our framework to realize our design goals.
4.1 Database Encryption
In our scheme, we adopt a state-of-the-art encryption scheme that supports comparison,
namely order-revealing encryption [19]. We first present the formal definition of order-
revealing encryption.
Definition 6 (Order-Revealing Encryption). An order-revealing encryption (ORE)
scheme [19] is a tuple of three algorithms including Setup, Encrypt and Compare de-
fined over a well-ordered domainD with the following properties:
– Setup(1λ) → sk: On input a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm outputs a
secret key sk.
– Encrypt(sk,m)→ ct: On input a secret key sk and a messagem ∈ D, the encryp-
tion algorithm outputs a ciphertext ct.
– Compare(ct1, ct2) → b: On input two ciphertexts ct1, ct2, the compare algorithm
outputs a bit b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
q[j]
p¦[j] p§[j]
(a) Case 1.
q[j]
p¦[j] p§[j]
(b) Case 2.
Fig. 3: Cases for the relationship between q and (pα, pβ)
Algorithm 2 SecureCompare Algorithm
Require: The ORE ciphertext for Enc(pα[j]), Enc(pβ[j]), Enc(q[j]), as well as Enc(pα[j] +
pβ[j]), Enc(2q[j]).
Ensure: The comparison result as −1, 0, 1 denoting that pα[j] is closer to (resp., equivalent
with, farther from) q[j] than pβ[j].
1: if ORE.Compare(Enc(pα[j]),Enc(pβ[j])) == 0 then
2: return 0
3: else if ORE.Compare(Enc(pα[j]),Enc(pβ[j])) == −1 then
4: if Enc(q[j]) falls outside the interval then
5: return ORE.Compare(Enc(q[j]), Enc(pα[j]))
6: else
7: return ORE.Compare(Enc(2q[j]), Enc(pα[j] + pβ[j]))
8: end if
9: else
10: if Enc(q[j]) falls outside the interval then
11: return ORE.Compare(Enc(q[j]),Enc(pβ[j]))
12: else
13: return ORE.Compare(Enc(pα[j] + pβ[j]),Enc(2q[j]))
14: end if
15: end if
With the help of ORE scheme, evaluating the dynamic domination relation between
pα and pβ can be carried out securely in ciphertext form as outlined in Algorithm 2.
For ease of subsequent discussion, we shall denote Enc(x) as the ORE ciphertext for
the original message x.
Minimizing the number of keys Following Observation 1, a data owner needs to
encrypt database P and the sum of any two tuples in P in each dimension, namely
pα[j] + pβ[j], where α 6= β, α, β ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, d]. The above two ciphertexts are
denoted as E(P ) and E(Φ), respectively. In this step, if we use the same private key on
both E(P ) and E(Φ), the sum of paired tuples in E(Φ), although encrypted, will leak
more message about plaintext beyond the order.
For example, assume that P contains five tuples, whose values in a particular di-
mension are a, b, c, d, e, respectively. Suppose that after sorting the values in ascending
order, we get b, c, a, e, d. Then their sums can be listed as b+ c, b+ a, b+ e, b+ d, c+
a, c+ e, c+d, a+ e, a+d, e+d. For ease of discussion, in the following we shall refer
to these values as pairs of sums. If we encrypt the results for these pairs of sums using
b+c b+a b+e b+d
c+a c+e c+d
a+e a+d
e+d
Sorted
data:
 b
 c
 a
 e 
 d
Sum:
b+c b+a b+e b+d
c+a c+e
c+d
a+e
a+d e+d< < <
<
< < <
<
Key2
Key1
Fig. 4: A novel encryption scheme for pairs of tuples
the same key as E(P ), an attacker can get the ordering of plaintexts. Therefore, he may
possibly know b+ e ≤ c+ a, and then infer that e− a ≤ c− b. In this way, besides the
order, the distribution of values in plaintext tuples is also leaked.
However, according to the security model in this work, except the order of tuples in
some dimensions, the cloud should not be able to infer the content of the tuples. There-
fore, we have to avoid leaking the distribution of data by adopting different keys in
ORE. Intuitively, an ideal method is to encrypt each pair of sums using a different key,
as it is not required to perform comparison among any pair of pα[j], pβ[j] according to
Algorithm 2. However, the increased number of keys will further introduce key man-
agement and storage problems. We propose a novel method to address this problem,
which is shown in Fig. 4.
As shown in Fig. 4, b, c, a, e, d are the sorted values for five tuples in P on a par-
ticular dimension. According to Algorithm 2, these values should be encrypted using
the same key as comparisons over their ciphertext are required. As a result, given that
Enc(b), . . . ,Enc(d) are encrypted using the same key under ORE, any adversary can
easily infer that b + c < b + a < b + e < b + d regardless that b + c, . . . , b + d are
encrypted with different keys or not. Therefore, it is not beneficial to use multiple keys
for such a group of sums.
Definition 7 (Order-Obvious Class). Given the order of a set of n elements, whose
exact values are unknown, if the order of two summations over paired elements can be
inferred, we call them Order-Obvious. All the n(n − 1)/2 paired summations can be
divided into several disjoint subsets accordingly, such that all the summations in each
subset are Order-Obvious. We refer to each subset as an Order-Obvious Class (abbrev.
OOC).
Generally, we can find all OOCs, which is classified using lines in Fig. 4. The rela-
tions for sums in the same OOC (e.g., line) can be inferred easily purely from E(P ). In
light of that, we can use the same key to encrypt the sums in the same OOC, and adopt
different keys across OOCs. In this way, any adversary cannot get additional informa-
tion over the ciphertexts besides the order, and we can effectively minimize the number
of keys. In particular, the minimum number of keys, denoted as κ, (e.g., the number of
lines in Fig. 4) have to satisfy the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In order to satisfy the predefined security model, the minimum number of
encryption keys in a dimension should be κ = ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉.
Proof. See in Appendix A.
Remark. Through the above strategy, we have minimized the required number of en-
cryption keys. In spite of that, κ is still linear to the increase of n, which may introduce
key management burden if n is very large. To address this, we suggest the following
implementations. For each row in Fig. 4, we assign it a random Idi. The data owner
only needs to store one master key mk and a series of random Idi. Then, keyi for en-
crypting each row is generated bymk⊕ Idi. In this way, we can effectively generate κ
different keys based onmk.
Accessing the pairs of sums As required by Algorithm 2, in order to compare tα[j]
and tβ [j], it is always required to retrieve the ciphertext of pα[j] + pβ [j]. Therefore, it
is necessary to build a map between the elements ofE(P ) with the corresponding sums
in E(Φ). That is, we need to build an index that maps Enc(pα[j]) and Enc(pβ [j]) to
Enc(pα[j] + pβ [j]). To this end, we present an index based on hash function. Formally,
we define a hash function as h : N2 → N, where N denote the set of natural num-
bers. The hash function h should satisfy the following property, ∀x1, y1, x2, y2 ∈ N,
h(x1, y1) = h(x2, y2) if and only if x1 = x2 and y1 = y2.
Assume the indices for Enc(pα[j]) and Enc(pβ [j]) in E(P ) are denoted as α and
β, respectively. Then the index of Enc(pα[j] + pβ[j]) in E(Φ) can be easily acquired
as h(α, β). Fig. 5 presents an example for the hash function. There are five encrypted
values in E(P ), namely a, . . . , e. The hash function in this example is simply designed
as a regular traversal order for the corresponding sums. In fact, any hash function that
satisfies the aforementioned property can be adopted here.
Indexing the pairs of sums Additionally, as all the pairs of sums within a particular
OOC are encrypted by ORE using the same key, we present to use additional index
structures for efficient retrieval of corresponding entries for these pairs of sums. There-
fore, we also design an index scheme for management of these ORE encrypted pairs of
sums. In SCALE, we adopt AVL-Tree based structure to construct the indexing structure,
as it provides the best efficiency when querying for a particular range. Specifically, it
is possible for us to build an AVL-Tree to index all these encrypted sums in the same
OOC. Notably, each AVL-Tree roots at the median of each OOC and all the nodes in an
AVL-Tree are the corresponding ciphertexts for pairs of sums in the same OOC.
For instance, given the records in Fig. 4, there are two OOCs. We shall build two
different AVL-Trees for indexing the corresponding ciphertexts for each OOC, respec-
tively. That is, the first OOC centered at b+ d corresponds to an AVL-Tree rooted with
Enc(b + d); another OOC centered at c + e corresponds to another AVL-Tree rooted
with Enc(c+ e) (as shown in Fig. 5).
In fact, data structures other than AVL-Tree can also be adopted to index the ORE
ciphertexts for eachOOC. We select AVL-Tree as the default setting in SCALE as it pro-
vides the best query response time among all the choices. Detailed comparison between
AVL-Tree and other choices will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Database encryption We have now all the ammunitions in place to demonstrate the
entire process of encrypting the database (Algorithm 3). First, the data owner generates
 c
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Fig. 5: The complete ciphertext storage structure
d + ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉ ∗ d keys (Line 1), and for each column (i.e., attribute) in P we encrypt
the entries using the same key (Lines 3-5), resulting in E(P ). Then, the data owner
sorts the entries (Line 8) in each column (i.e., attribute) and computes the sums for
pairs of entries in each dimension. Afterwards, the sums are then encrypted using the
corresponding keys as shown in Fig. 4 (Lines 9-17), resulting in E(Φ). Finally, the data
owner sends E(P ), E(Φ) to the cloud server.
Besides, the data owner also creates a hash function h that maps each pair of ele-
ments in E(P ) and the corresponding sums in E(Φ), and sends h to the cloud server. It
is now possible for the cloud to quickly locate the ciphertext of the corresponding sums
for each pair (pα[j], pβ[j]).
4.2 Query Processing
A data user needs to register their information to the Data owner and securely get the
keys. Then the query user encrypts the request according to Algorithm 4 before sending
it to the cloud server.
As shown in Algorithm 4, user encrypts each dimension of the query tuple using
corresponding keys (Line 2) and encrypts the doubled entries for the query tuple using
other keys (Lines 4-5). Finally, the user sends Enc(q), Enc(2q) to the cloud server. As
mentioned in Algorithm 1, given an encrypted query q as shown Algorithm 4, the cloud
server needs to perform comparisons and computations over encrypted data. Accord-
ing to the approach shown in Fig. 3, the cloud server can perform skyline query via
the comparison relationship with encrypted tuples, encrypted query request, encrypted
sums, and encrypted doubled request. As a result, the process described in Algorithm 1
can be now performed in ciphertext without decryption, which is shown in Algorithm
5.
To illustrate the entire protocol, we provide a running example in the following.
Example 1. For the convenience of representation, we assume that P contains five tu-
ples, whose entries in dimension 1 are sorted as 7, 13, 21, 32, 53.
According to Algorithm 3, we shall first compute the sums for all pairs of values,
e.g., 7+13 = 20, 7+21 = 28, 7+32 = 39, 7+53 = 60, 13+21 = 34, 13+32 = 45,
13+53 = 66, 21+32 = 53, 21+53 = 74, 32+53 = 85. As shown in Theorem 1, the
number of encryption keys required for these sums can be calculated as ⌈ 2∗5−34 ⌉ = 2.
Algorithm 3 Dataset Encryption
Require: The dataset P
Ensure: The ciphertexts sets E(P ), E(Φ)
1: generate d+ ⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉ ∗ d keys with ORE.Setup as keys[]
2: for p ∈ P and j in 1, . . . , d do
3: Enc(p[j]) ← ORE.Encrypt(keys[j], p[j])
4: let Enc(p) = {Enc(p[1]), . . . ,Enc(p[d])} and add Enc(p) to E(P )
5: end for
6: letm = 1
7: for j in 1, . . . , d do
8: Λ = (p(1)[j], . . . , p(n)[j]) ← sort p1[j], . . . , pn[j] in ascending order
9: while Λ is not empty do
10: for i in 2, . . . , len(Λ) do
11: add ORE.Encrypt(keys[d+m], p(1)[j] + p(i)[j]) to E(Φ)
12: end for
13: for i in 2, . . . , len(Λ)− 1 do
14: add ORE.Encrypt(keys[d+m], p(n)[j] + p(i)[j]) to E(Φ)
15: end for
16: remove the first and last elements in Λ, letm = m+ 1
17: end while
18: end for
19: return E(P ), E(Φ)
Therefore, we use two keys to encrypt the above sums, resulting in Enc1(20), Enc1(28),
. . . , Enc1(85) and Enc2(34),Enc2(45),Enc2(53).
Besides, we also need to use another key to encrypt the original tuples, e.g.,Enc3(7),
Enc3(13), . . . ,Enc3(53). Suppose that a user submits a query with q[1] = 23. Then q
and 2q need to be encrypted according to our scheme, resulting in Enc1(46),Enc2(46),
Enc3(23). These ciphertexts are then sent to the cloud server. The cloud server compares
ciphertexts one by one according to the protocol. Through ORE.Compare and Algori-
thm 2, the cloud server can easily determine that Enc3(32) dominates Enc3(53) follow-
ing the case shown in Fig. 3a. Similarly, Enc3(21) dominates Enc3(7) and Enc3(13). In
the case shown in Fig. 3b, Enc3(21) dominatesEnc3(32) becauseORE.Compare(Enc2(
53),Enc2(46)) = 1. Algorithm 5 will iteratively repeat this process for all dimensions
and remaining tuples.
4.3 Maintenance Issues
Modifications over database records (insert, delete, update) are fundamental require-
ments in database applications. In light of that, hereby we discuss the strategies to sup-
port these operations in our framework. As depicted in Fig. 4, the cloud server stores
these encrypted sums of data values in different OOCs, which contributes the most
expensive maintenance cost. Hence, the way how these encrypted sums are stored is
fundamentally important. In fact, many index structures can be used to accomplish this
task. In SCALE, we adopt AVL-Tree [1], as it presents the best efficiency in search-
ing for an entry due to the strictly balanced structure. In fact, we have considered and
Algorithm 4 Query Request Encryption
Require: The query data q, keys from data owner keys[]
Ensure: The ciphertexts Enc(q), Enc(2q)
1: for j in 1, . . . , d do
2: Enc(q[j]) ← ORE.Encrypt(keys[j], q[j])
3: form in 1, . . . , ⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉ do
4: let key_num = d+ (j − 1) ∗ ⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉+m
5: Enc(2qm[j]) ← ORE.Encrypt(keys[key_num], 2q[j])
6: end for
7: end for
8: return Enc(q), Enc(2q)
Table 2: Functional comparison over different structures for insertion and deletion
Data Struc-
ture
Advantages Disadvantages
Linked List Easy implementa-
tion
Expensive cost
AVL-Tree Shorter query time
than Red-black
Tree
Longer response time for
the insert and delete oper-
ations
Red-black
Tree
Longer query time
than AVL-Tree
Shorter response time for
the insert and delete oper-
ations
compared several different structures including Linked list, AVL-Tree and Red-black
tree. Table 2 shows the functional comparison over the advantages and disadvantages
of these data structures in our models. In the following, we shall sequentially describe
how insertion and deletion is supported in SCALE using AVL-Tree.
Insertion As described in Section 4.1, the entries for each records should be encrypted
in multiple copies. Therefore, any newly inserted records have also to undertake the
same procedure. For example, assume that the data owner adds a new tuple f to the
existing database described in Fig. 5, which contains a, b, c, d, e, and b < c < f <
a < e < d. In the manner described above, the data owner encrypts the tuple for each
dimension using different keys. Afterwards, the data owner computes b+f , c+f , f+a,
f + e, f + d and encrypts them with different groups (Fig. 6) of keys. Finally, these
encrypted values are uploaded to the server.
As depicted in Fig. 7a, the cloud server adopt an AV L − tree to store encrypted
sums of entries for each OOC shown in Fig. 6. For instance, there are two OOCs in
the left part of Fig. 6, which show the OOC for existing records, we implement two
corresponding AVL-Trees to store the OOCs, e.g., one tree rooted at b+ d and contains
all the sums in the same OOC, and the other tree rooted at c+ e and contains two other
sums, namely c+ a and a+ e. As shown in Fig. 6 and 7b, b+ f , f + d belongs to the
Algorithm 5 Secure Skyline Query Algorithm
Require: The ciphertext for dataset E(P ), query request Enc(q), sums for tuples E(Φ) and
doubled query request Enc(2q)
Ensure: The encrypted result set of skyline points S
1: for i in 1, . . . , n do
2: if S is empty then
3: add Enc(pi) to S
4: else
5: flag_cur ← True
6: for each Enc(pj) ∈ S do
7: form in 1, . . . , d do
8: flag[m] ←SecureCompare(Enc(pi[m]), Enc(pj [m]), Enc(q[m]), Enc(pi[m] +
pj [m]), Enc(2q[m]))
9: end for
10: if ∀m, flag[m] ≥ 0, and ∃k such that flag[k] > 0 then
11: flag_cur ← False
12: else if ∀m, flag[m] ≤ 0, and ∃k such that flag[k] < 0 then
13: delete Enc(pj) from S
14: end if
15: end for
16: if flag_cur is True then
17: add Enc(pi) to S
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: return S
same OOC with b+ d and can be inserted into the corresponding positions in the AVL-
Tree rooted with b+ d. Similarly, the corresponding ciphertexts for c+ f , f + e will be
inserted into another AVL-Tree rooted with c + e. Moreover, f + a will be inserted to
a new AVL-Tree rooted with f + a.
Deletion On the other hand, data owners also may have to delete tuples from existing
database. In this scenario, SCALE also need to update the corresponding indices that
are associated with the deleted records. For example, assume that the data owner want
to delete a tuple e in b, c, a, e, d. In the manner described in Section 4.1, data owners
encrypt the tuple for each dimension using different keys. Besides, the data owner have
already computed the sums including b+ e, c+ e, a+ e, d+ e and encrypt them with
different groups (Fig. 8) of keys. All the corresponding ciphertexts have been uploaded
and stored in the cloud server.
As depicted in Fig. 9a, in SCALE, the cloud server use an AV L − tree to store the
sums in eachOOC with the same key. AVL-Tree structure provides efficient deletion ef-
ficiency. Whenever e is deleted from the database, the corresponding sums with respect
to e, e.g., b + e, e + d, c+ e and a + e, shall also be removed from the corresponding
AVL-Trees. In particular, b + e and e + d shall be removed from the AVL-Tree rooted
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Fig. 7: Inserting b+ f and f + d into the AVL-Tree
at b + d (as shown in Fig. 9b), which will be then balanced accordingly afterwards;
similarly, c+ e, a+ e will be removed from another AVL-Tree rooted at c+ e.
Update Notably, all the existing data records are stored in ciphertext form according
to our framework. In ciphertext space, the update operation cannot be directly applied.
Instead, it is interpreted as deleting an existing encrypted record and then insert a new
encrypted record.
4.4 Security Analysis
Insert and delete operations on AVL-Tree may provide opportunities for side channel
attacks. But it is not the key point of this paper and some existing work can solve
this problem. It would not be discussed here. The presented SCALE framework is con-
structed based on ORE scheme proposed in [19], which is secure with leakage function
LBLK . The particular lemma is defined as follows.
Lemma 1. The ORE scheme is secure with leakage function LBLK assuming that the
adopted pseudo random function (PRF) is secure and the adopted hash functions are
modeled as random oracles. Here, LBLK(m1, . . . ,mt) = {(i, j, BLK(mi,mj))|1 ≤
i < j ≤ t} and BLK(mi,mj) = (ORE.Compare(mi,mj), inddiff(mi,mj)), in
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Fig. 9: Deleting b+ e and e+ d from the AVL-Tree
which inddiff is the first differing block function that is the first index i ∈ [n] such that
xi = xj for all j < i and xi 6= xj . (The proof of this lemma is in Appendix 4.1 in [19]
and is omitted here.)
In order to formally prove the security of SCALE, we extend L-adaptively-securemodel
for keyword searching scheme as shown in Definition 5.
Theorem 2. Let the adopted PRF in ORE is secure. The presented SCALE framework
is L-adaptively-secure in the (programmable) random oracle model, where the leakage
function collection L = (LEncrypt,LQuery ,LInsert,LDelete) is defined as follows,
LEncrypt = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n)
k ),LQuery = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n)′
k ),
LInsert = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n+1)
k ),LDelete = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n)
k )
where X
(n)
k = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Y
k
t ), X
(n)′
k = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Y
k
t ∪ Enct(q) ∪ Enct(2q)) and
Y kt = {Enc(pt[k] + pj[k])|t < j < n− t+ 1} ∪ {Enc(pj [k] + p(n−t+1)[k])|t < j <
n− t+ 1}.
The advantage for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is,
|Pr[GameR,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[GameS,A(λ) = 1]|
≤ negl(λ) = d · (neglORE(λ) + (2n− 1)poly(λ)/2λ).
Proof. See in Appendix B.
Table 3: The time complexities of inserting and deleting a record using linked list, AVL-
Tree, and Red-black Tree
Data Structure Insertion Deletion
Linked list O(n2) O(n2)
AVL-Tree O(nlogn) O(nlogn)
Red-Black tree O(nlogn) O(nlogn)
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Fig. 10: Response time by varying the number of tuples (with d = 3, block = 16,K =
256)
4.5 Complexity Analysis
In the encryption phase, the plaintext data from the data owner can be sorted and en-
crypted in advance. We need O(d + ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉) encryption operations every time when
a user submits a query following Algorithm 4.
During the querying phase, our scheme replaces the original plaintext subtraction
and comparison operations with a limited number of comparisons over ciphertext. The
time taken for encryption and ciphertext comparisons is only affected by the block size
in ORE, key length in AES, and plaintext length. Therefore, we have not changed the
main logic for dynamic skyline query processing. Hence, the complexity for the query
processing phase in our scheme is consistent with that of [7]. That is, the complexity is
O(n2) for the worst case.
Afterwards, we shall discuss the complexity for inserting and deleting operations.
In particular, the main complexity in insertion and deletion of records lie in the update
of corresponding AVL-Trees for the sums of records pairs. Notably, the number of
AVL-Trees to store these sums should be equal to the number of OOCs. As described
above, the number of OOCs is ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉. The time complexity of inserting and deleting
elements should be ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉ times the complexity of inserting and deleting elements in
different data structures. It’s important to note that we need to find the corresponding
positions before deleting and inserting elements. Table 3 shows the time complexity for
inserting and deleting elements by adopting different data structures other than AVL-
Tree.
5 Experimental Study
In this section, we evaluate the performance and scalability of SCALE under different
parameter settings over four datasets, including both real-world and synthetic ones. We
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Fig. 11: The effects of different parameters (n = 2500)
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Fig. 12: Performance of different indexing structure during insertion
also compare our model with another baseline, namely BSSP [20,21], which is the only
solution for secure dynamic skyline query.
5.1 Experiment Settings
All algorithms are implemented in C, and tested on the platform with a 2.7GHz Intel
Core i5 processor and 8GB of memory running MacOS. We use both synthetic datasets
and a real-world dataset in our experiments. In particular, we generated independent
(INDE), correlated (CORR), and anti-correlated (ANTI) datasets following the seminal
work in [7]. In line with [20,21], we also adopt a dataset that contains 2500NBA players
who are league leaders of playoffs5. Each player is associated with six attributes that
measure the player’s performance: Points, Offensive Rebounds, Defensive Rebounds,
Assists, Steals, and Blocks.
5.2 Performance Results
In this subsection, we evaluate our protocols by varying the number of tuples (n), the
number of dimensions (d), the ORE block setting, and the length of key (K).
Varying the number of tuples. Fig. 10 shows the time cost by varying the number of
tuples, namely n, on the four datasets. In this group of experiments, we fix the number
of dimensions, ORE block size and key length as 3, 16 and 256, respectively. We ob-
serve that for all datasets, the time cost increases almost linearly with respect to n. This
phenomenon is consistent with our complexity study in Section 4.5. Notably, for the
real-world dataset (i.e., NBA), the query response time is less than 0.2 seconds, which
5 It is acquired from https://stats.nba.com/alltime-leaders/?SeasonType=Playoffs.
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is efficient enough in practice. Compared to the state-of-the-art [20], SCALE is more
than 3 orders of magnitude faster. In the following, we shall fix n = 2500 and focus on
evaluating the effects of the three parameters in our scheme.
Impact of d. Fig. 11a shows the time cost for different d on the four datasets, where
we fix the ORE block size and key length as 16 and 256, respectively. For all datasets,
as d increases from 2 to 6, the response time in all four datasets increases almost expo-
nentially as well. This fact is consistent with the ordinary dynamic skyline querying in
plaintext. This is because an increase in d leads to more comparison operations for the
decision of dynamic dominance criteria.
Impact of ORE block. Encrypting plaintext based on block cipher, different block sizes
may take different time. Fig. 11b plots the time cost by varying the block sizes used in
the ORE scheme, where d and K are fixed as 3 and 256, respectively. As mentioned
in [19], this ORE scheme leaks the first block of δ-bits that differs, therefore, increasing
the block size brings higher security. Observe that the response time increases slightly
with respect to the size of ORE block. That indicates, higher security level in ORE has
to sacrifice some response time.
Impact ofK . Fig. 11c shows the time cost by varying the lengths for the keys in the
ORE scheme. This ORE scheme uses AES as the building block, therefore, increas-
ing the encryption key size brings in higher security. Similar to that of block size, the
response time also increases linearly with respect to the size of encryption keys. Com-
paring Fig. 11c against 11b, we can make the following observations. First, increasing
the security level for ORE scheme will definitely sacrifice some efficiency. Second, the
key length in AES exhibits more significant impact on the efficiency comparing to that
of ORE block size.
Maintenance cost. We extensively perform another group of experiments to test the
performance by adopting different index structures for managing the encrypted pairs of
sums whenever insertion or deletion occurs. In particular, we compare three different
structures including Linked List, Red-black Tree and AVL-Tree. Notably, as [20,21]
does not support modifications over existing database records, this method is not taken
into account within this group of experiments.
Firstly, for each of the datasets, we sequentially insert (encrypting and uploading)
new records into the database and evaluate the average response time for insertion of
the corresponding ciphertext into existing indices, which includes both the time for
searching the targeted position for insertion within the Lists or Trees as well as re-
balancing the Trees, if needed, afterwards. The average response times, which are taken
from 10 independent runs, for inserting different number of records using the three
index structures are shown in Fig. 12. In all the test for each dataset and index structure,
we fix the parameters as d = 3, block = 16,K = 256. Through the results in all
the datasets, it is obvious that Linked List performs the worst, with about one order of
magnitude larger running time than the other two Tree-based competitors. Both AVL-
Tree and Red-Black Tree exhibit similar performance, much better than the Linked List.
All these phenomenon is consistent with the complexities for these structures shown in
Table 3.
Secondly, given all the existing datasets encrypted and stored using SCALE, we fur-
ther test the response time for deletion of arbitrary records. Similar to the previous
experiments, the response time includes both the time for searching the targeted posi-
tion for deletion within the Lists or Trees as well as re-balancing the Trees, if needed,
afterwards. The average response times, which are taken from 10 independent runs,
for deleting different number of records using the three index structures are shown in
Fig. 13. We also fix the parameters as d = 3, block = 16,K = 256 throughout all
the datasets. According to the results in all the datasets, Linked List performs the worst
again, with about one order of magnitude larger running time than the other two Tree-
based competitors. Both AVL-Tree and Red-Black Tree exhibit similar performance.
The cost for all the methods increase with respect to the number of deleted records.
Notably, throughout all the datasets in both Fig. 12 and 13, Red-Black Tree is
slightly better than AVL-Tree for inserting new records or deleting existing ones, as
it do not need to strictly balancing the tree after each insertion or deletion. However,
unbalanced tree structure will inevitably lead to worse query performance. Hence, there
is a trade-off between the maintenance cost and query cost in selecting a solution from
the two different tree-based index structure. In particular, when query performance is
more sensitive, AVL-Tree should be adopted (all other experiments in this section are
conducting based on this method); when maintenance cost is more sensitive, Red-Black
Tree should be a better choice.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a new framework called SCALE to address the secure
dynamic skyline query problem in the cloud platform. A distinguishing feature of our
framework is the conversion of the requirement of both subtraction and comparison
operations to only comparisons. As a result, we are able to use ORE to realize dynamic
domination protocol over ciphertext. Based on this feature, we built SCALE on top of
BNL. In fact, our framework can be easily adapted to other plaintext dynamic skyline
query models. We theoretically show that the proposed scheme is secure under our
system model, and is efficient enough for practical applications. Moreover, there is
only one interaction between user and the cloud, which minimizes the communication
cost and corresponding threats. Besides, we also present a mechanism for modification
over existing stored records. Based on the proposed mechanism, insertion, deletion and
update of records can be all efficiently supported by SCALE. Experimental study over
both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrates that SCALE improves the efficiency
with at least three orders of magnitude compared to the state-of-the-art method. As part
of our future work, we plan to further enhance the security of our scheme and explore
how the scheme can be adapted to support other variations for skyline query.
A Proof of Theorem 1
As shown in Fig. 4, the relations for sums in the same class (e.g., line) can be inferred
easily fromE(P ). Obviously,n elements can be divided into κ groups in the way shown
in Fig. 4. In detail, given n elements, we can organize all the paired summations of them
into a matrix, whose row/column correspond to each element and are arranged accord-
ing to the descending order of the elements. Each entry is the sum of the corresponding
row and column. As it is a symmetrical matrix, all the paired sums can be found in
the upper-right corner without the diagonal. Obviously, all the entries along the borders
(upper and right) of the corner belong to the same OOC. By removing these entries
from the matrix, we can iteratively find several inner borders (i.e., OOCs). Obviously,
the first OOC contains 2n− 3 entries, and each subsequent class has 4 entries less than
previous one. Hence, the total number of classes is κ = ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉. Assuming that we use
κ−ǫ secret keys for encryption, there must exist twoOOCs sharing the same key. Then,
the cloud may infer the distribution of values in plaintext tuples in the aforementioned
way. In this regard, besides the order, the distribution of the values in a dimension is
also leaked, which deviates from the security model defined in Section 3.2. Therefore,
to realized the predefined security requirements, the minimum number of keys for pairs
of sums in a dimension should be at least κ.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let the leakage function collection be
L = (LEncrypt,LQuery ,LInsert,LDelete).
Assumption. The real game GameR,A strictly follows the presented SCALE construc-
tion. In the ideal gameGameS,A, hush functions are replaced by random oracles. Con-
cretely, S maintains several hash tables for the adopted ORE scheme and another hash
table consisting of tuples (in, out) ∈ ({0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗)×{0, 1}λ. The first hash tables
work as [19] states, and the second hash table works as shown in Algorithm 6. Specif-
ically, h in Section 4.1 is replaced by RO which works as shown in Algorithm 6. The
rest part of ideal secure skyline query follows the presented SCALE construction.
Analysis. Notably, the leakage function of the adopted ORE scheme is LBLK . Then, by
introducing the conclusion in [19], the advantage for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary breaking ORE is
|Pr[GameORER,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[Game
ORE
S,A(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl
ORE(λ).
By convention, the security and information leakage is derived fourfold as follows.
In the following convention, we begin by the case that pi is one-dimensional. Then, the
conclusion for multi-dimensional can be facilely generalized since the secret keys for
each dimension are completely independently selected.
Algorithm 6Work flow of random oracle (RO).
Require: in
Ensure: out
1: if ∃(ini, outi) ∈ RO such that ini = in then
2: Return outi;
3: else
4: out
R
←− {0, 1}λ;
5: Add (in, out) into RO;
6: Return out;
7: end if
EncryptS . In the process of database encryption, the database is originally sorted in
ascending order.
On one hand, for any pi, pj ∈ P and i 6= j, the result of pi + pj is encrypted by
ORE scheme. During the encryption, ⌈ 2∗n−34 ⌉ secret keys are independently selected to
minimize the information leakage. By convention of the encryption for pairs of tuples as
illustrated in Fig. 5, there are no valid encrypted pairs of tuple such that pi+pj < pk+pℓ
and i < k < j < ℓ. In such case, for each OOC of encrypted pairs of tuples, there is
no effective algorithm to infer any distributions in a single OOC. The leakage function
for t-th OOC is LBLK(X) such that X = {Enc(pt + pi)|t < i < n − t + 1} ∪
{Enc(pi + p(n−t+1))|t < i < n − t + 1}. Additionally, all OOCs are encrypted with
independent secret keys. Hence, the complete leakage function is LBLK(X), where
X = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Yt) and Yt = {Enc(pt + pj)|t < j < n − t + 1} ∪ {Enc(pj +
p(n−t+1))|t < j < n − t + 1}. Because, such a leakage cannot put any effect on
breaking ORE, the advantage for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary breaking
SCALE from this point of view is less than or equal to neglORE(λ).
On the other hand, the searching process is speedup by introducing h as shown
in Section 4.1. In the simulation, h is replaced by RO. The input of RO is Enc(pi +
pj), and the output is a random number with λ bits. If there exist k and ℓ such that
pk + pλ = pi + pj , the probability for RO(Enc(pi + pj)) 6= RO(Enc(pi + pj)) is at
most poly(λ)/2λ. The largest OOC contains 2n − 3 ciphertexts, so the probability of
breaking SCALE from this perspective is at most (2n− 3)poly(λ)/2λ.
The probability of breaking SCALE is neglORE(λ) + (2n − 3)poly(λ)/2λ during
database encryption. The leakage function is LBLK(X), where X = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Yt)
and Yt = {Enc(pt+pj)|t < j < n− t+1}∪{Enc(pj+p(n−t+1))|t < j < n− t+1}.
QueryS . During query, according to the query request encryption as shown in Algori-
thm 4, for each chain of encrypted pairs of tuples, q and 2q are encrypted and temporar-
ily inserted into the chain. Since cloud is assumed be semi-honest and will store all
temporary results (i.e., Enc(q) and Enc(2q)), then the leakage function is LBLK(X ∪
Enc(q) ∪ Enc(2q)) such that X = {Enc(pt + pi|t < i < n − t + 1)} ∪ {Enc(pi +
p(n−t+1))|t < i < n − t + 1}. Hence, the complete leakage function is LBLK(X),
where X = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
i=1 (Yt ∪ Enct(q) ∪ Enct(2q)), Yt = {Enc(pt + pj)|t < j <
n − t + 1} ∪ {Enc(pj + p(n−t+1))|t < j < n − t + 1} and the advantage for any
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary breaking SCALE from this point of view is still
≤ neglORE(λ). Additionally, from the view of random oracle, due to that there is no
additional data that are inserted into the ciphertext storing structure, the probability of
breaking SCALE from this point is still at most (2n− 3)poly(λ)/2λ. In a word, during
query, the probability of breaking SCALE is neglORE(λ) + (2n − 3)poly(λ)/2λ, and
the leakage function is LBLK(X), where X = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
i=1 (Yt ∪ Enct(q) ∪ Enct(2q))
and Yt = {Enc(pt+pj)|t < j < n− t+1}∪{Enc(pj+p(n−t+1))|t < j < n− t+1}.
InsertS . During insertion, there will be n encrypted pairs of tuples that are inserted
into the chains for only a single tuple. The conclusion can be derived by deducing
the conclusion for EncryptS . During insertion, the probability of breaking SCALE is
neglORE(λ) + (2n − 1)poly(λ)/2λ, and the leakage function is LBLK(X), where
X = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−1
4
⌉)
t=1 (Yt) and Yt = {Enc(pt + pj)|t < j < n − t + 2} ∪ {Enc(pj +
p(n−t+2))|t < j < n− t+ 2}.
DeleteS . During deletion, there will be n encrypted pairs of tuples that are removed
from the chains for each single tuple. However, a semi-honest cloud may not remove
such pairs. So, the probability of breaking SCALE and the leakage function should be
the same as that in EncryptS . Therefore, for one-dimensional data, we can conclude
that the leakage function during different phases are as follows.
LEncrypt = LBLK(X
(n)),LQuery = LBLK(X
(n)′),
LInsert = LBLK(X
(n+1)),LDelete = LBLK(X
(n))
where X(n) = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Yt), X
(n)′ = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Yt ∪ Enct(q) ∪ Enct(2q)) and
Yt = {Enc(pt + pj)|t < j < n− t+ 1} ∪ {Enc(pj + p(n−t+1))|t < j < n− t + 1}.
Then, the advantage for breaking SCALE is at most neglORE(λ)+(2n−1)poly(λ)/2λ.
In fact, each record may have d dimensions. The secret keys for each dimension
are selected independently, so the leakage function is the union of leakage for each
dimension, and the advantage for breaking SCALE is d times larger than that for each
dimension.
Conclusion. The leakage function in different phases are as follows.
LEncrypt = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n)
k ),LQuery = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n)′
k ),
LInsert = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n+1)
k ),LDelete = LBLK(∪
d
k=1X
(n)
k )
where X
(n)
k = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Y
k
t ), X
(n)′
k = ∪
(⌈ 2∗n−3
4
⌉)
t=1 (Y
k
t ∪ Enct(q) ∪ Enct(2q)) and
Y kt = {Enc(pt[k] + pj[k])|t < j < n− t+ 1} ∪ {Enc(pj [k] + p(n−t+1)[k])|t < j <
n− t+1}. Therefore, the advantage for breaking SCALE is at most d · (neglORE(λ) +
(2n− 1)poly(λ)/2λ).
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